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Abstract
The paper investigates the extent to which Stanley Fish’s constructivism and E.D. Hirsch’s
hermeneutics are similar in their assumptions and program. Although it is commonly
accepted that they constitute polar opposites of literary theory, Fish and Hirsch are
embedded in the theoretical discourse of New Criticism’s approach to literary studies and
develop in a form of critique of the formalist stance. The problems they encounter and the
way they approach literary texts are shaped by formalist assumptions that eventually lead
to serious discrepancies between their postulated theory and practice. Both theories of
interpretation seem to be operating within a similar framework of ideas which determines
their understanding of the problems regarding literary studies as well as their solutions.
What appears to be even more important is that the ‘‘textual” theoretical framework itself
causes serious problems for both programmes of literary hermeneutics.
1. Introduction
The purpose of the article will be to investigate to what extent are Stanley
Fish’s constructivism and E.D. Hirsch’s hermeneutics similar in their
assumptions and program. It is commonly accepted by literary scholars that
Hirsch and Fish constitute polar opposites of literary theory. Both of them
started their intellectual careers as diehard rebels against the formalism of
the New Critics who, nevertheless, attempted to follow radically different
paths of neopragmatist constructionism, and of traditional intentionalist
hermeneutics respectively. However, both Hirsch and Fish are firmly
embedded in the theoretical discourse of New Criticism’s approach to
literary studies, and develop in a form of critique of the formalist stance.
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Although their critiques follow different paths, the problems they encounter
and the way they approach literary texts are largely shaped by formalist
assumptions that eventually lead to many possibly erroneous claims
concerning both language and interpretation. Eventually, the theories of
interpretation of both Hirsch and Fish seem to be operating within a similar
framework of ideas which determines both their understanding of the
problems regarding literary studies and their solutions. Finally, it will be
argued that the ‘‘textual” (which is understood here as any form of semantic
autonomy with regards to literary texts) theoretical framework itself causes
serious problems for both programmes of literary hermeneutics.
2. E.D. Hirsch
To consider E.D. Hirsch a scholar who is unable to move beyond essentialist
thinking about literary texts is somewhat of a cliche´ in literary theory. For
instance, Stanley Fish explicitly contrasted his own views with Hirsch’s by
beginning his famous Is There a Text in This Class?, by answering the
eponymous question that ‘‘there isn’t a text in this or any other class if one
means by text what E.D. Hirsch and others mean by it, ’an entity which always
remains the same from one moment to the next’” (1980: VII). Apart from the
fragment quoted by Fish, Hirsch made many other strong statements
concerning the text’s stability. For example:
When, therefore, I say that a verbal meaning is determinate I mean that it is an
entity which is self-identical. Furthermore, I also mean that it is an entity which
always remains the same from one moment to the next – that it is changeless
(1967: 46).
In the face of taking such a strong stance, it is indeed very tempting to
classify Hirsch as a traditional essentialist. A closer analysis enacted here,
will, however, try to cast some doubt on such a simplistic treatment of Hirsch.
It will also attempt to show how Hirsch, who started his theoretical work as
a critical response to the textualism of the New Critics, fails to abandon some
of their assumptions, and in the end, his theory encounters unsolvable
problems and moves towards something different than what the aforemen-
tioned critics thought.
Hirsch’s major work, Validity in Interpretation, begins with a fierce attack
on the formalist, New Critics’ theories which claim that the structure of the
text itself contains the meaning and any kind of authorial information is
irrelevant to its understanding. Hirsch opposes what he calls the ‘‘doctrine of
semantic autonomy” (1967: 1), which holds that meaning is located in the text
itself, as for him it cannot exist ‘‘outside the realm of human consciousness”
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(1967: 4).Text, as represented by graphic symbols, is empty and cannot mean
anything. In fact, we cannot even say that it contains words and sentences
unless we acknowledge that it represents somebody’s meaning, which, in
turn, initiates the process of construing. The claim that textual meaning
exists only in human consciousness leads to a recognition that meaning can
only be attributed to an author or a reader, which is obviously in stark
opposition to what New Critics considered the source of textual meaning.
Hirsch does not accept the New Critical maxim that appealing to authorial
intention is irrelevant in analyzing texts, the famous ‘‘Intentional Fallacy”, as
for him it seems obvious that one can never avoid authorial meaning, and the
abolishment of the original author as the final determiner of textual content
only leads to embracing of the reader as a new author.
Even worse, according to Hirsch, semantic autonomy leads to
a replacement of one determiner of meaning with an infinite number of
others. This, in turn, leads to a confusion, as the rejection of the original author
is also a rejection of ‘‘the only compelling normative principle that could lend
validity to an interpretation” (1967: 5). Hirsch admits that the actual non-
existence of such a principle could only be true if any of the arguments held
against the author were justified, since the abolishment of the author indicates
that ‘‘no interpretation can possibly correspond to the meaning of a text” (1967:
5), with the readers creating their own meanings, among which there cannot be
any convincing criteria of distinguishing the correct and the wrong ones, leaving
the textual meaning in a state of indeterminacy.
After attacking the followers of formalist textual autonomy, he proceeds
to confront the rest of the claims raised against the author. Although Hirsch
agrees with the anti-psychologistic argument that we cannot know the intentio
auctoris with certainty because we cannot enter his psyche, he claims this is
irrelevant to interpretation, as our object of investigation is the text, and we
can only access the meanings which are sharable through language and not
the private meanings in the author’s mind, ‘‘in the world beyond the reach of
written language” (1967: 14). Since we lack certainty, interpretation must rely
on probability judgments based on all the accessible data in determining the
textual meaning. Finally, Hirsch responds to those who claim that the
meaning of the text changes over time by introducing a crucial distinction
into a text’s ‘‘meaning”, which is unchangeable, and its ‘‘significance”, which
is prone to change:
It is not the meaning of the text which changes, but its significance... . Meaning is
that which is represented by a text; it is what the author meant by his use of
a particular sign sequence; it is what the signs represent. Significance, on the other
hand, names a relationship between that meaning and a person, or a conception,
or a situation, or indeed anything imaginable (1967: 8).
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Thus, Hirsch offers a definition of verbal meaning that is binding in the
investigation of intentio auctoris: ‘‘[v]erbal meaning is whatever someone has
willed to convey by a particular sequence of linguistic signs and which can be
conveyed (shared) by means of those linguistic signs” (1967: 31).
It is important to note at this point that before Hirsch proceeds to the
positive part of his work, which includes his ideas on the very practice of
interpretation, he makes a clear statement about the ontological status of
texts. The text, he suggests, has no meaning and no content unless it is
construed in the reader’s mind. Therefore, there is nothing in the nature of
a text that requires the interpreter to choose intentio auctoris as a normative
ideal. The sign as such is devoid of any content, it is mute, and every
interpreter faces a choice of the interpretive ideal, determined by his goals
and values. For Hirsch, any kind of reader-oriented reading is rejected
precisely on ethical grounds, as whenever the interpreter sets himself a goal
which can be reduced to exploring the contents of his own mind, the
interpretation is, for Hirsch, pointless and unnecessary in the first place. At
the same time, however, Hirsch points out that anyone who claims validity for
his interpretation is caught in a ‘‘web of logical necessities” (1967: 26) that
anti-intentionalists cannot successfully disentangle. If this validity is to be
accepted, the interpreter has to face his interpretation with a ‘‘genuinely
discriminating norm” (1967: 26) and it appears to him that, apart from
appealing to the authorial intention, no other compelling and sharable norm
exists.
From the very beginning, Hirsch’s theory is marked with a paradox. The
aim of his work is to defend the traditional hermeneutical concepts of the
stable, determinate meaning and the possibility of objective interpretation,
but, at the same time, he acknowledges some of the ideas about the text’s
indeterminacy and temporality that question the objectivity of interpretations
or the author’s importance, and which became increasingly popular with the
emergence of New Criticism. His merging of the two contradictory trends
proved to be highly problematic. The need to control the text’s meaning and
to save its monolithic identity, yet, still accepting its dynamic character, has
been regarded by some scholars as a ‘‘schizophrenic” approach to the text
(Kalaga 2001: 27). Moreover, Hirsch’s insistence on placing ethics and values
as the foundation of every interpretive and critical activity appears to be
actually questioning the strict meaning/significance distinction, as signifi-
cance is, in fact, granted the superior role that determines meaning according
to the interpreter’s personal preferences. Even in the process of construing
authorial meaning, what is considered evidence supporting some hypothesis,
has to be rooted in the reader’s own values and ethics. Hirsch’s idea of
collecting evidence that supports specific interpretive hypotheses is rather
simplistic and mechanical. He seems to omit the fact that according to his
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own views, the interpreter’s choice of evidence will also be value-driven.
Thus, different readers, cultures, scientific and interpretive communities may
consider different things as proper evidence. This, in fact, implies the shift
from the temporal and dynamic character of Hirsch’s notion of significance
to the temporal character of the author’s meaning. It can be sensed on the
pages of Hirsch’s works but it is never verbalized or carried to its logical
implications.
The problem is also noticeable when Hirsch uses his meaning/
significance distinction to rebut psychologism. Although he makes a general
statement that it is possible to reproduce another person’s meaning, he then
seems to take it for granted that such attempts are always successful, and
claims that different perceptions of meaning might, in fact, belong to the
sphere of significance. Regardless of the question whether Hirsch is right or
wrong in this case, he does not solve the problem of psychologism, but simply
dodges it. The meaning/significance problem is treated too light-heartedly, as
Hirsch does not explain whether certain changes and revisions in what the
interpreters might call the author’s meaning would belong to the sphere of
meaning or significance, or how to differentiate between them. His
accusation that psychologism confuses the mental processes with their object
is also questionable, since it posits the literary object as being totally
independent of mental processes, or maybe even external to them. That
would imply a form of semantic autonomy, or formalism, that Hirsch fiercely
attacked. Furthermore, if the interpreter’s task is to reconstruct the author’s
intention through the work on the text, the construction may never reach the
state of ahistorical stability and certainty. The intentions, as the interpreters
construe them, might change, and Hirsch does not specify in what cases
would those changes belong to the sphere of meaning and when to that of
significance. Unfortunately, this attitude might also be called schizophrenic
and his reasoning definitely lacks the ultimate anti-psychologistic argument.
Not only does the meaning/significance distinction indicate Hirsch’s
schizophrenic attitude, but it poses serious threats to the very practice of
literary study. George Wilson, responding to the radical intentionalist
arguments from the perspective of analytical philosophy of language, quite
correctly observed that if Hirsch’s distinction into the sharable verbal
meaning and its subsequently ascribed contexts is supposed to encompass the
whole spectrum of phenomena relating to meaning and understanding of
a literary text, ‘‘then a great deal of what we seek to interpret in a work will
fall in neither of Hirsch’s categories” (1992: 182). He further adds that:
a poem or work of literary fiction is more or less extended discourse, and the
structures and strategies of a discourse have meanings that outrun the meanings
of its component inscriptions.(...) I may know the linguistic meaning expressed by
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each of the sentences ’All men are mortal; Socrates is a man; Socrates is mortal.’
And I may know that each utterance has the force of an assertion. But if I do not
grasp that this short discourse constitutes an argument from which the conclusion
is supposed to follow, then I have missed a key aspect of the key of utterances
taken as a whole (1992: 182).
Thus, Hirsch’s model is not able to explain the emergence of meaning
of larger structures in the interpreter’s mind, relying solely on the idea of
simple, dictionary-like verbal meaning. He does not seem to notice the more
complex procedures of understanding that are impossible to grasp in terms of
the semantics of words and sentences alone. Hirsch, therefore, by relying on
the antiquated Saussurian linguistics (which at the same time endorsed a form
of semantic autonomy that Hirsch attacked) and its vision of language as
a dictionary commits the typical structuralist fallacies.
Hirsch is aware that his defence of the author and the objectivity of
interpretation is hard to reconcile with his basic assumptions about language
and meaning. The theory that he offers has problems fulfilling some of its
aims; determinacy of meaning and the objective interpretation cannot be
grounded in the text itself and Hirsch is forced to introduce elements of
pragmatist foundation to support his views. Thus he frequently remarks
about the need to constantly confront and compare different interpretations.
This in fact indicates that the meaning has to be eventually accepted
conventionally, by a community of scholars in the process of continuous
dialogue of different interpretations, which brings him closer to neopragma-
tist ideas of Stanley Fish.
Taking into consideration some of the problems with Hirsch’s
hermeneutics raised above, it is crucial to determine how those issues affect
Hirsch’s position in the essentialist discourse, with which he is usually
associated. Unfortunately, the ambivalence of his position becomes
intensified. On the one hand, Hirsch’s rhetoric defends the traditional quest
for truth, reason and objectivity, along with the notion of stable, determinate
textual meaning. On the other hand, he openly rejects essentialism, claiming
that ‘‘the sign is mute.” The rejection of ontology and the declaration that the
text’s meaning exists only in the mind of a reader, who creates it himself, does
not bring him closer to essentialism, but to constructionism. Similarly,
although Hirsch outlines literary genres as if they had fixed traits,
determinate nature and boundaries, he denies them any deep structure,
comparing them to Wittgensteinian non-essentialist word games that share
vague family resemblance instead of strictly defined features. Elsewhere,
Hirsch rejects any metaphysics as such, declaring, as if he were a militant
logical positivist, that ‘‘Metaphysics is the night where all cows are black”
(1976: 32). Taken at its face value, the statement is obviously absurd, as
Hirsch makes in his work as many metaphysical assumptions as any other
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theoreticians. It does show, however, his anti-theoretical, and anti-methodo-
logical bent.
Hirsch, thus, never fully breaks free from the textualist assumptions of
the New Criticis. Although, he redefines textual meaning so as to save its
stability, in reality he smuggles the textualism back into his theory, in the
guise of a meaning which is supposedly particular, determinate, and sharable,
and at the same time construed solely according to the textual evidence. He
still looks at literary texts from textualist perspective, and, as a result, the
arguments against Hirsch’s supposed essentialism stem from his inability to
explicitly reject the most crucial newcritical assumptions about the text, that
is the notion of an autonomous verbal icon. Paradoxically, the construc-
tionists’ argument against Hirsch is, in the end, an argument against the New
Critics who eventually prove to represent essentialism themselves.There are
certain reasons to suspect that Hirsch’s hermeneutics must inevitably lead to
a form of pragmatism. Some typically pragmatist ideas, like the shift of
philosophical focus from ontology and metaphysics towards ethics, and the
aversion towards essentialism, have already been mentioned. Hirsch is also
willing to support Knapp’s and Michaels’ repudiation of theory in favour of
practice, calling himself ‘‘anti-theoretical theorist”(1985: 48). His logic of
interpretative validation contains an implicit acknowledgment of the
importance of dialogue and the conventional, consensual establishment of
literary interpretations which seem to gain more dynamic character.
Moreover, he approves of Stanley Fish’s theory of interpretive communities
(1982: 240).
Even his insistence on the ethical foundation of the practice of
interpretation is pragmatic. Since there is no ontologically motivated,
objective principle that compels the readers in their choices of interpretive
method, such choices must be made according to values, purposes and
practical consequences. Hirsch’s idea of the primacy of values goes as far as
to say that even truth is a matter of politics, a kind of ideology (1982: 235–
236). Thus, Hirsch starts as a confident defender of determinacy and
objectivity only to arrive at a final, neopragmatist conclusion that the choice
of the interpretive method is arbitrary and political. Objectivity and
determinacy become, as a result, only two of the infinite number of personal
and subjective aims of interpretation that one sets for oneself.
Some scholars (Hermeren 1977: 364–365) noted that Hirsch’s argument
in Validity in Interpretation, which started as a heroic and firm defence of the
author, gets weakened throughout the book, and his attack on relativism and
‘‘cognitive atheism” (Hirsch 1976: 3) is gradually halted. Indeed, the
schizophrenic problems resulting from the meaning/significance distinction
become intensified in his description of the process of validation. Moreover,
instead of defending the traditional methods of interpretation, his emerging
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anti-theoretical bent, along with his ethical foundation of interpretation, and
the rejection of ontology, invokes the spectre of relativism, which is
constantly haunting his work, and which leads to a gradual decomposition
of his early hermeneutic program.
3. Stanley Fish
An example of a theorist who in his dispute with the New Critics assumed
a position on the other side of the barricade than Hirsch, namely, in the
trenches of what Wimsatt and Beardsley called ‘‘The Affective Fallacy”, is the
American neopragmatist Stanley Fish. He started his intellectual career from
a standpoint of a reader-oriented theory hostile towards the New Critics, and
although his ideas evolved over time, one notion always remained central to
Fish’s theory, namely, the anti-essential concept of textual meaning, which he
considered not being enclosed in the text and then discovered by the reader,
but actually being produced by him in the process of interpretation. Indeed,
most of his work in this field is marked with a desire to defend the idea of
meaning as constructed by the reader, in opposition both to the essentialism
of the formalists and to the Hirschian type of intentionalism. As Fish himself
wrote in the introduction to his collection of essays entitled Is there a text in
this class?, ‘‘in 1970 I was asking the question ’Is the reader or the text the
source of meaning?’ and the entities presupposed by the question were the
text and the reader whose independence and stability were thus assumed”
(1980: 1). Not only did he acknowledge the influence of Wimsatt and
Beardsley on the final shape of the problem he considered, but at the same
time he rejected the Hirschian notion of authorial intention as the goal of
interpretation. As a result, much of his early work on textual meaning was
devoted to the renunciation of the textual authority in favour of the
enthronement of the reader in the hermeneutic domain.
The tension between the reader-oriented and the presumably formalist
elements of his work produced a couple of problems that Fish found
impossible to solve solely on the grounds of his reader-response assumptions.
The first problem appeared with Fish’s account of the overcoming of the
subjective and idiosyncratic in the reader experience. Arguing in favor of
a more objective, shared reading, he was unwillingly confronted with the
formalist notion of the text which is itself responsible for producing similar,
shared responses. The other problem was that his own theoretical
assumptions turned against him, as he realized that if every theory produces
its own results, its own meanings, then there really is no reason why his
reader-response approach might be deemed superior or less fallacious than
the formalist one that he opposed.
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The first step taken by Fish was to claim that the meaning of a supposedly
fixed text appears only in the process of reading and only within the reader’s
experience. The static, formal elements of the text gain meaning only in the
context of the reader’s activities. One might call it a classical constructionist
stance, resembling, in different and more self-conscious words, Hirsch’s
slogan ‘‘the sign is mute” mentioned in the first chapter.
According to Fish, meaning emerges from the reader’s predictions and
expectations, rather than from the process of discovering the actual content
of the text on the page. As he claims, the text is not a ‘‘container of meaning”
(1980: 1), but precisely the opposite: ‘‘the reader’s response is not to the
meaning; it is the meaning” (1980: 3). Humans are ‘‘significance fabricating
beings” (1980: 145) and they hypothesize about intentions, look for
references, build up coherent meanings, disentangle ambiguities, etc. all
the time during the process of reading. They do not begin to ascribe
meanings and interpret after the reading is finished, dealing with finite, larger
fragments, exclusively. At this point one might raise a very obvious objection,
which was also mentioned by E.D. Hirsch, Jr. in his attack on the reader
authority, namely, that if the textual meaning is only a construction of
reader’s subjective responses and expectations, then the meanings are
absolutely arbitrary and there exists no demarcation between valid and
invalid interpretations, and consequently, the study of literature becomes
impossible. Fish is aware of this difficulty, and, interestingly, pleas for
abandoning such a subjectivist attitude. In his own words ‘‘the proper
practice of literary criticism demanded the suppressing of what is subjective
and idiosyncratic in favour of the level of response that everyone shares”
(1980: 5). Unfortunately, the simplistic solution where readers having the
literary competence would share similar responses (whether they know it or
not)(1980: 6) leads back to the formalist stance, as in order to argue for
a shared reading experience or response one presupposes ‘‘an object in
relation to which readers’ activities could be declared uniform, and that
object was the text” (1980: 17). As a result, the integral, determinate,
formalist idea of the text paradoxically returns in this description of the
interpretive process as a stable object to which the readers respond.
Fish approached this early problem by radicalising the reader-oriented
aspect of his theory even more. In an essay entitled ‘‘What is Stylistics” he,
again, emphatically rejects the essentialist idea of the text as a repository of
meanings which are discovered and studied by the interpreter, in favour of
the claim that the very interpretive activities constitute the entities that are to
be interpreted, that is to say, that interpretation begins as soon as the reader
decides that what he is looking at should count as a text and not just as
a random doodle (1980: 94). Such claims may, however, lead to self-
confirmability of interpretations. Hirsch was aware of that and thought the
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problem needed to be resolved through comparative method, dialogue
among the members of the scientific community and the use of a probabilistic
criteria in judging the textual content. In a somewhat opposite manner, Fish
did not recognize it as a problem to be resolved, but as a fact that cannot be
undone. It is impossible, he claims, to step outside the theory, beliefs,
presuppositions that one holds and attempt to disconfirm them. As he says
‘‘Theories always work, and they will always produce exactly the results they
predict” (1980: 68). Interpretations, or theories, are self-confirmable, but
they are not simply random, as individual readers, according to Fish, do not
have competence to actually produce and establish valid interpretations.
Although the ability to interpret is ‘‘constitutive of being human” (1980: 172),
individuals never interpret freely and independently of some assumptions.
These assumptions, in turn, precede the very process of interpretation and
determine its final shape and product. Interpretive entities are, thus, always
already situated within a context of certain community-established assump-
tions that provide interpretive strategies and constrain the hermeneutic
activity of individuals. In other words, the idea of interpretation being
irrevocably determined by the pre-established assumptions and strategies is
defended here by introducing a higher-order restrictive entity. At the same
time, it is precisely the concept of interpretive communities that is supposed
to save the practice of literary studies from ‘‘the pit of psychologism” (Drong
2007: 110), by severely limiting the number of possible interpretations. Fish’s
definition of interpretive communities has changed over the years, but
initially they were meant to be
made up of those who share interpretive strategies not for reading (in the
conventional sense) but for writing texts, for constituting their properties and
assigning their intentions (1980: 171).
Another aspect of Fish’s hermeneutics rooted in New Critical assump-
tions was his understanding of intentionalism. Fish holds any autonomist
theory that considers literature a deviation from the ordinary, formal features
of the language to be fundamentally wrong. Neither is it possible to locate the
deviational, formal features of literature and the standard, stable, context-
free features of ordinary language. Thus, for Fish literature is not something
that can be defined in terms of its formal features It is rather a matter of
human, collectively made decision as to what shall be identified as literature.
This decision, in turn, is purely a matter of choice which is not driven by
anything else but the goals established by human activity.
The idea that texts cannot have autonomous, context-free meanings
leads Fish to embrace a form of intentionalism. For him, words cannot have
on their own any basic or normal, ordinary meanings as they can only acquire
meanings which intentional beings construct on specific occasions, in various
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contexts. Thus, meanings cannot be derived from any formal structures or
conventional categories. They always require intentional action to attribute
one (or more), context-determined, temporal sense from the infinite
repository of possible meanings. This leads him to an assertion that intention
is necessary for the practice of interpretation. It is only through assuming that
meaning is uttered by an intentional being in a specific context that one can
try to determine any temporarily fixed meanings. But Fish is not an
intentionalist in the traditional sense of a theorist who sets the intention of
the empirical author as the source of meaning that needs to be discovered in
an arduous process of interpretation. His point is that the reader, in the
process of constructing the meaning of a text, postulates about the possible
intentions. The content of authorial intention is, thus, in Fish’s account, not
a normative principle that one should follow but a construct of the
interpretive entity which is necessary in order to produce sense out of
a piece of language at all. The posited intention does not have to agree with
the actual intention of the author. In fact, the reader needs not to be
interested in pursuing it. Neither does it constrain, as a force located outside
the actual interpretation, the interpretive practice. It is simply a guess, a posit
that a reader creates, ascribing the text’s origin to some intentional being,
regardless of the facts about the actual author.
A possible problem with Fish’s hermeneutics might be his attachment to
radical Cartesian assumptions which underlie his reader-response hermeneu-
tics. Fish’s early claims that theories and interpretations are always entirely
produced by an individual, self-contained subject was leading him straight into
the impressionist relativism, and, to overcome this, he introduced the notion of
interpretive communities to his theory. Some scholars (Dasenbrock 1993: 19)
insist that there are remarkable similarities, in certain aspects, between his idea
of interpretive communities and Thomas Kuhn’s concept of scientific
communities. For Kuhn individual scientific theories are only parts of broader
paradigms that have to be shifted as a whole, in a turbulent and gradual process,
in order to bring about some real change of perspective. These paradigms set
limits, the basic framework, in which scientists, in a given social and cultural
context, operate and devise new theories. Kuhn claims that the aforementioned
paradigms are incommensurable, that is, one paradigm is impossible to
understand within a conceptual framework of another paradigm. In this view,
scientists working within different paradigms ‘‘work in a different world” (1962:
135). As Dasenbrock observed, according to Kuhn, communication can only
exist within a given paradigm. Therefore, it is never possible to simply step
outside the assumptions one holds and the conceptual framework within which
one operates. This means that it is not a serious mistake to say that Kuhn’s
scientific communities are in many ways equivalent to Fish’s interpretive
communities (Dasenbrock 1993: 21).
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Dasenbrock proposes that, since certain similarities have been noticed, it
might be useful to apply Donald Davidson’s criticism of Kuhn’s conceptual
relativism to the work of Stanley Fish (1993: 21). In Davidson’s words:
Conceptual schemes, we are told, are ways of organizing experience; they are
systems of categories that give form to the data of sensation; they are points of
view from which individuals, cultures, or periods survey the passing scene. There
may be no translating from one scheme to another, in which case the beliefs,
desires, hopes and bits of knowledge that characterize one person have no true
counterparts for the subscriber to another scheme. Reality itself is relative to
a scheme: what counts as real in one system may not in another (1973: 5).
Davidson continues to say that the examples of differences between such
supposedly incommensurable conceptual schemes are what usually supports
this view and comments that:
But examples like these, impressive as they occasionally are, are not so extreme
but that the changes and the contrasts can be explained and described using the
equipment of a single language. Whorf, wanting to demonstrate that Hopi
incorporates a metaphysics so alien to ours that Hopi and English cannot, as he
puts it, ‘‘be calibrated”, uses English to convey the contents of sample Hopi
sentences. Kuhn is brilliant at saying what things were like before the revolution
using -what else? -our post- revolutionary idiom (1973:6).
One might add that Fish is brilliant at describing the incommensurable
theoretical stances of other literary scholars, or the contents of disparate
interpretations or programmes of rival interpretive communities, using his
own body of theory. His immediate, Cartesian reply would probably be that he
can never know the actual contents of the other person’s mind/theory and is
just projecting his own ideas. But the truth seems to be quite the opposite;
saying that the contents of the other person’s mind are unknowably different
already presupposes knowledge of those contents to such an extent as to claim
the difference. According to Davidson’s persuasive account, accepting such
form of incommensurability would not only render it impossible to talk about
similarities and differences between paradigms or interpretive communities,
but would also make the contents of one’s own mind inaccessible.
Another problematic question is Fish’s stance on the relation between
meaning and intention. To say that words can only acquire meaning as a result
of human activity and in a context is a truism. As a matter of fact, it is hard to
imagine any modern philosopher of language who would hold a caricature,
opposing position that Fish ascribes to him or her. What he calls essentialist,
abstract meanings are in fact contextualized meanings in a given language.
This is the point of George Wilson’s reply to a similar, radically intentional
account of meaning provided by Fish’s fellow neopragmatists Knapp and
Michaels (1985: 11–31):
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Suppose that one plausibly holds that the word slumber means (roughly) ‘‘sleep”
in English. In holding this, one supposes that there is an established practice
among speakers of the language of using the relevant sound sequence an/or
inscription with certain intentions, that is, with the intention that the given token
count as an instance of the word slumber and with the further intention that the
word be understood as applying, in the particular utterance, only to cases of sleep.
No doubt this supposition presupposes that the relevant sound and inscription
types are employed with some considerable regularity by English speakers who
have the indicated intentions. But none of this entail that each instance of the
sound or inscription types connected with the word slumber must itself be an
instance of the word slumber nor that it must mean ‘‘sleep.” [...] It is simply false
that the idea that words or sentences mean something in a language is in any way
incompatible with the intentionality theses that Knapp and Michaels emphasize
so much (1992: 182).
Hence, one may say that those ‘‘literal”, dictionary meanings which Fish
attacks, are not literal in the sense of possessing certain abstract essences, but
their literalness is simply a matter of regularity of language use, and thus,
expectations. They obviously can acquire absolutely any meaning, depending
on the context, but one can start to identify those less frequent, idiosyncratic
meanings only if one knows the literal meanings in the first place (Davidson
1993: 300).
The other fallacy that Fish ascribes to the formalists, or essentialists, is
their rejection of the reader experience in the very process of reading. As was
indicated earlier, he assumes that it is a mistake to think of interpretation as
a process of pondering upon the meaning of a whole text, or a whole passage
after reading it. For him, interpretation begins in the process of reading and
not after it is finished. But when Fish was forced, in a reply to John Reichert
(1980: 296), to elaborate on that point, he admitted that interpretation is
a multi-level process, where human beings operate on many layers of
assumptions, some of them remain deeper and more intact in specific
contexts, some are more superficial and volatile. One might compare it to
Hirsch’s distinction into understanding, that is, recognizing, the semantic,
verbal units and structures, and interpretation, or the interpretive guesses
about particular meaning, both of which are, in the end, elements, or levels,
of the same process. The very existence of those levels, or layers, and their
interrelatedness seems to be, for Fish, a strong argument against determinacy
and essentialism, proving the superiority of the subjective-constructionist
model of his Cartesian relativism. But he seems to forget that those layers do
not form an amorphic, indistinguishable muddle, but are distinct from each
other, as he, in fact, himself admitted earlier, and that communication occurs
between specific layers and on the condition that they are not confused. In
Fish’s words ‘‘assumptions are not all held at the same level and that
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a challenge to one proceeds from within the precinct of others that are, at
least for the time being, exempt from challenge” (1980: 296). The very fact
that Reichert and Fish can debate, agree or disagree, criticize and exchange
opinions is a case in point.
Therefore, Fish acknowledges that the process of interpretations is not
only gradual but multi-level, with different layers of assumptions and degrees
of activity being simultaneously put into operation when necessary. This
remarkable insight indeed confirms that the process of interpretation begins
when the interpreter decides to call something a piece of language, but it also
follows that such a decision brings about certain ontological commitments.
The act of naming something a language already contains deeper layers of
suppositions about the rational beings that uttered it, its intentional content,
its formal structures and the social and historical contexts of the utterance, all
of which are later developed and adjusted relying on the influx of new data. It
follows that Fish’s argument against formalists is rather far-fetched as both
sides seem to be overlooking the forest for the trees, by artificially abstracting
one element (the text, or the reader’s response) of the larger process of
interpretation and calling it the interpretive process itself. Fish’s insight
implicitly indicates that both the simplistic reader-oriented and formalist
approaches must, in fact, be only levels of a more complex hermeneutic
process.
4. Conclusion
The interesting fact is that both the development of Fish’s and Hirsch’s
theory might be easily understood as struggle to overcome some problems
posed by the formalist theory of the New Critics. Fish, on the one hand,
rejects the autonomist assumptions about the text, but on the other, he is
unable to develop a totally alternative programme for literature. He
recognizes the failure of the formalist project and tries to defend reader-
response theory, but seems to be defending precisely the version of reader-
response described and condemned by the New Critics. He seems to have
embraced the radical constructionist approach to literary meaning, which, in
turn, compelled him to struggle with the problems of relativism and
impressionism. Hirsch tries to reconcile the traditional 19th century
hermeneutics with some of the anti-psychological assumptions of the New
Critics, but it only produces some more theoretical problems, such as the
ambivalent attitude towards the text, and leads him eventually close to the
neopragmatist camp. Both theorists seem to be unable to move beyond the
assumptions and the general framework set by the New Critics. As a result,
they not only pose similar theoretical questions and share some (neoprag-
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matist) assumptions and aspects of their programs, but also encounter
parallel problems.
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